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Pay for performance has been a widely used method of compensation in the public sector
since the early 1980s, but a growing body of research has indicated that numerous problems
can be associated with the application of performance-based compensation systems In late
1993, the federal government, after years of difficulty experienced with its merit pay
program, took a significant step back from pay for performance through passage of the
Performance Management and Recognition System Termination Act This research seeks to
determine whether state governments are becoming similarly disenchanted with pay for
performance To gain insight into this question, a survey was administered to a nationwide
random sample of state agency personnel management executives Results indicate that pay
for performance remains as popular as ever in state government, and that nearly all of the
systems in the states utilize merit pay despite difficulties often associated with that approach
to pay for performance.
n the late 1970s and early 1980s pay-
for-performance systems were widelymewed as important and mnovative
mechanism for enhancmg pubhc employee
morale and productivity. The basic argu-
ment for these compensation structures,
i.e., the notion that compensation should
be made proportional to performance, is
often appealing, and the general features
of pay for performance are by now well
known-excellent performers are to receive
higher pay mcreases while average and
poorer performers earn lower adjustments
to pay. The federal government’s experi-
ence with this concept dates largely from
the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978.
Shortly after the federal program was mti-
ated, state governments also began experl-
mentmg with pay for performance (Argyle,
1982), and by the mid-1980s more than
twenty states had systems in place where
employees with higher performance ratings
received higher compensation than those
with lower ratings (Lawther et al., 1989;
U.S. General Accounting Office, 1990).
There are a variety of approaches to the
implementation of pay for performance.
The most common approach, and the ap-
proach that has received the most atten-
tion m the professional literature, consists
of individualized performance-based wage
incentives, usually known as merit pay.
Merit pay distributes awards for superior
performance as permanent mcreases to an
mdividual’s base salary. As a result, awards
distributed will continue to impact an
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mance warranting recognition has faded
mto the past. An alternative approach is
to give the award as a one time bonus pay-
ment separate from the mdividual’s base
pay. Under a system of bonuses, supenor
performance is rewarded only for the pe-
riod dunng which it has been observed. A
third vanant distributes awards (merit pay
or bonuses) on the basis of group rather
than individual effort because of difficul-
ties sometimes associated with individual-
ized performance appraisals. Group-based
incentive systems, known as gam sharmg
or variable pay, reward an entire organiza-
tional umt or work group for exceptional
performance in meetmg organizational
goals.
Despite the popularity of pay for perfor-
mance m the public sector, by the late 1980s
and early 1990s the effectiveness of this
compensation strategy was called mto ques-
tion. Research on the topic had generated
evidence that pay-for-performance systems,
particularly merit pay plans, could often be
problematic. Numerous scholars docu-
mented difficulties associated with merit
pay, including problems connected with
performance evaluation, the apparent re-
luctance of government to adequately
fund the systems, and the fact that merit
pay often led to dysfunctional competi-
tion among employees (Ingraham, 1993a;
Lovrich, 1987; Milkovich and Wigdor,
1991; Pearce & Perry 1983; Perry, 1988-
89 ; Perry & Pearce, 1985). As evidence
of problems associated with merit pay sys-
tems grew, the federal government re-
treated from the concept by terminating
the Performance Management and Rec-
ognition System (the federal merit pay
system) in 1993 (U.S. Statutes at Large,
1993). Employees who had been covered
by the ment pay program were returned to
the general schedule pay structure. in et-
fect, the federal service was required to
abandon the concept of individualized wage
incentives added to base pay. Under cur-
rent regulations, federal agencies may con-
tinue incentive programs, mcludmg cash
awards, but wage incentives may only be
distributed as one-time bonuses (U.S. Fed-
eral Register, 1995)’ I
Have state governments similarly backed
away from the concept of merit-pay? This
is a central question to be addressed m the
present study. While much of the research
that has highlighted the questionable util-
ity of merit pay has focused on the federal
experience, there is evidence that states
have also confronted problems (Ingraham,
1993a, 1993b; Lovnch, 1987; Nachmias &
Moderacki, 1982). It has been suggested,
however, that there may be a vanety of po-
htical and symbolic reasons for unsdictions
to continue the use of merit pay even
though it may not always be particularly
effective instrumentally (Fox & Miller,
1992; Kellough & Lu, 1993; Perry, 1988-
89). This research seeks to discover the
extent to which pay-for-performance sys-
tems remain in place m state government,
whether merit pay is the dommant ap-
proach where pay for performance is used,
and whether state executives at the fore-
front of public personnel management prac-
tice perceive pay for performance as a vi-
able approach to compensation administra-
tion. Do public personnel managers who
may be responsible for the administration
of pay-for-performance systems m state or-
ganizations see the same problems that have
been identified in the literature ?
Methodology
In order to develop an understandmg of
the current use of pay-for-performance sys-
tems by state governments, a questionnaire
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7was mailed m 1994 to a nationwide ran-
dom sample of 350 personnel managers lo-
cated m state agencies. Managers from all
fifty states were mcluded m the sample. The
questionnaire sought mformation regardmg
the utilization of pay for performance, the
type of system used, and perceptions of the
advantages of pay for performance as well
as any disadvantages or problems that might
have been experience.
Respondents were guaranteed anonym-
ity. A postcard with return postage was
mcluded m the mailing with the survey m-
strument and cover letter as Dillman (1978)
suggests, and respondents were asked to
return the postcard separately to mdicate
that they had returned the questionnaire.
In this way, respondents and nonrespond-
ents could be tracked, but there was no way
to associate respondents with returned
questionnaires. To boost the response rate,
a follow-up mailing of postcard reminders
was sent to nonrespondents approximately
four weeks after the ongmal mailing. Four
weeks later, a second follow-up remmder
with a copy of the questionnaire was sent
to those who had still not responded. One
hundred and eighty-nine completed surveys
were returned producmg a response rate of
54 percent.
Results
Responses were received from person-
nel managers from all fifty states. Approxi-
mately 46 percent of the respondents were
women and 54 percent were men. All ma-
jor racial/ethnic groups were represented,
with 79.9 percent of respondents bemg
white, 12.8 percent Afncan Amencan, 3.9
percent Hispamc, 1.7 percent Asian, and
1.7 percent Native American. Respondents
ranged m age from 32 years to 68 with a
mean of 47. In terms of educational at-
tamment, nearly 44 percent held graduate
degrees, with the MPA and MA being the
most frequently held credentials. An addi-
tional 43 percent of respondents held bach-
elor degrees. Thirteen percent possessed
only a high school education.
More than 75 percent of the respondents
had 10 or more years of work experience m
personnel management-a majority having
worked exclusively in the public sector.
Sixty-eight percent of respondents were in
positions covered by classified civil service
systems while 32 percent were political ap-
pomtees. Position titles mcluded &dquo;Direc-
tor, Personnel Division,&dquo; &dquo;Human Resource
Manager,&dquo; &dquo;Personnel Manager,&dquo; &dquo;Chief,
Personnel Programs Division,&dquo; &dquo;Deputy
Assistant Director of Personnel,&dquo; and other
related titles. Responsibilities of the respon-
dents covered the full range of personnel
management tasks includmg supervision of
job analysis, classification, compensation,
performance management, traming, and
plannmg.
Are State Governments Retreating from
Pay-for-Performance?
Managers from 30 different states, rep-
resentmg approximately 34 percent of all
respondents, indicated that the state
agency, bureau, or department m which
they were employed had a pay-for-perfor-
mance system in place at the time of the
survey. Coupled with findings from earlier
research mdicatmg that considerably fewer
states had pay for performance in the 1980s,
this findmg suggests that state governments
are not moving away from compensation-
based incentive structures. Of course, re-
sponses were not uniform m all of the 30
states where use was reported. In most of
the states with pay for performance, there
were some personnel managers who mdi-
cated that their particular organization did
not use such a system. Earlier research
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zation. Apparently the number of orgam-
zations and employees covered by state pay-
for-performance systems vames to a sigmfi-
cant degree within each state. Lawther et
al. (1989), for example, found 22 states us-
mg pay for performance m 1987, but the
number of employees covered differed from
state to state. Similarly, the U.S. General
Accounting Office (GAO) found that pay-
for-performance systems were m place m
23 states in 1989, but there was consider-
able variation across states in the number
and types of employees mcluded in the sys-
tems (U.S. General Accounting Office,
1990). As a result, an indication that the
concept has been used recently by orgam-
zations in as many as 30 different states pro-
vides evidence that the &dquo;general movement
toward pay for performance&dquo; noted by the
GAO m 1990 has contmued despite a grow-
mg body of research suggesting that such
systems can be fraught with difficulty.~ 2
Is Merit Pay Still the Dominant Approach
for Linking Pay and Performance?
More than nmety percent of the respon-
dents whose organizations utilized pay for
performance reported that their system al-
located awards based on mdividualized per-
formance evaluations and that awards were
distributed as permanent increases in the
individual’s base pay. Thus, according to
survey results, merit pay remams the most
frequently occurring manifestation of pay
for performance in the states despite the
fact that it is perhaps the most problematic
approach to pay for performance. By com-
panson, only 52 percent of the respondents
reported that their organizations used mdi-
vidualized bonuses and 11 percent reported
using group-based incentives. Some orga-
mzations using merit pay, however, were
also using bonuses or group incentives. In
fact, 42 percent reported using merit pay
along with other approaches, while 48.3
percent mdicated that merit pay, i.e., indi-
vidualized awards added to base pay, was
the only approach utilized. A relatively
small proportion of state personnel manag-
ers (9.7 percent) reported that their agency
used bonuses or group-based approaches ex-
elusively.
Is Pay-for-Performance Perceived as an
Effective Tool for Motivating Employees
and Increasing Productivity?
The logic underlying pay for perfor-
mance is that the system will mcrease em-
ployee motivation and productivity by m-
creasmg the likelihood that superior per-
formance will lead to monetary benefits.
Personnel managers from organizations us-
ing pay for performance were asked to rate
the overall effectiveness of the approach.
As Figure 1 shows, a majority (56.5 percent)
agreed that pay for performance is an ef
festive tool for motivating employees and
mcreasmg productivity. Specifically, 6.5
percent strongly agreed that pay for perfor-
mance is effective, 16.1 percent agreed, and
33.9 percent agreed slightly. By contrast,
only approximately 26 percent of the re-
spondents disagreed with the notion that pay
for performance is effective and 18 percent
were unsure. These findings reveal a some-
what more positive impression of pay for
performance among state government offi-
cials than that reported in earlier work by
Ingraham (1993b) and, as a result, provide
further evidence of the continumg appeal
of pay for performance in the states.
Ingraham interviewed 20 directors of state
central personnel agencies and found that
only 40 percent rated their state’s pay-for-
performance system as &dquo;somewhat effec-
time&dquo; or &dquo;effective.&dquo;
In order to better understand general
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for performance, the relationship between
managers’ perceptions of effectiveness de-
picted 111 Figure 1 and a number of indi-
vidual and organizational variables possibly
associated with those perceptions was ex-
ammed. Multiple regression analysis pro-
duced results depicted in Table 1. Four of
the eight variables included m the model
bear a statistically significant relationship
to perceptions of pay for performance as an
effective tool for motivating employees and
Figure 1. Perception of the Effectiveness of Pay for Performance
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mcreasmg productIVIty.3 The amount of
expenence a respondent has m personnel
management, for example, is negatively as-
sociated with attitudes toward pay for per-
formance. That is, as years of experience
in personnel management increase, the
perception of pay for performance as an ef
festive strategy declmes. Respondents with
more expenence are more likely to be skep-
tical of pay for performance. One explana-
tion for this result may be that those man-
agers with more experience are more at-
tuned to the many problems so often asso-
ciated with pay-for-performance systems,
especially merit pay plans.
A second variable that is significantly
associated with respondents’ perceptions is
whether on not the respondent is a politi-
cal appomtee. While a majority of the per-
sonnel management executives surveyed in
organizations utilizmg pay for performance
were m classified civil service positions, a
substantial proportion (32 percent) were
political appomtees. As indicated m Table
1, these respondents were much more likely
to have a positive perception of pay for per-
formance. This outcome may be due to the
political and symbolic impact of this ap-
proach to compensation. Pay for perfor-
mance may have important political value
as a symbol of the government’s effort to
promote bureaucratic productivity
(Kellough & Lu 1993; Perry 1988-89).
It is also interestmg to observe that re-
spondents with expenence in the private
sector are sigmficantly more negative in
their assessments of pay for performance
than are respondents who have worked
exclusively m the pubhc sector. At first
glance, this result may seem counter-intui-
time since advocates of pay for performance
often cite successful expenence in the pri-
vate sector as a justification for adoption m
government, but it has been well docu-
mented that application m the private sec-
tor have encountered their own share of
problems (Ingraham, 1993a). Furthermore,
as Ingraham (1993a) has suggested, the
relative lack of management flexibility and
control characteristic of the public sector
may be mconsistent with innovations such
as pay for performance. It may be the case
that managers who have expemence m the
private sector are more sensitive to diffi-
culties pecuhar to the use of pay for perfor-
mance m public orgamzations.
A final vamable significantly associated
with respondents’ perceptions of pay for
performance has to do with the coverage
of the system m place in the respondent’s
orgamzation. More specifically, respon-
dents from organizations with systems that
cover both management and nonmanage-
ment employees (as opposed to manage-
ment alone) are sigmficantly less inclined
to consider pay for performance an effec-
time tool than are respondents whose sys-
tems are limited to management. In other
words, as coverage of the system mcreases
to include both management and nonman-
agement employees, perceptions of the ef
fectiveness of pay for performance go down.
This outcome suggests that additional prob-
lems may be encountered when pay for per-
formance is applied to those m nonmana-
gerial positions.
Other variables in the model fail to dem-
onstrate a statistically significant relation-
ship with respondents’ perceptions of pay
for performance, although the direction of
the relationship revealed is consistent with
what was expected. The respondent’s level
of education, the size of the respondent’s
organization, the method of pay for perfor-
mance utilized (i.e., merit pay exclusively
or an alternative approach using bonus or
group mcentives either exclusively or m
combination with memt pay), and the num-
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ber of years that pay for performance has
been m place are all msigmficant m their
impact on perceptions of the effectiveness
of pay for performance (see Table 1). Of
these results, the finding that the method
of pay for performance utilized has no sig-
nificant impact on perceptions of effective-
ness is perhaps most mterestmg. This re-
sult suggests that, despite the potential
problems associated with ment pay, respon-
dents with systems that rely exclusively on
that approach are not significantly more
negative m their perceptions of pay for per-
formance than are those who have a merit
pay system combmed with other approaches
or have used other approaches exclusively.’
What Positive Outcomes Are Associated
with Merit Pay?
Because merit pay has been such a
prominent approach to pay for perfor-
mance, respondents whose organizations
utilized merit pay were asked whether they
agree or disagree that merit pay has led to
certain specific benefits. Results from this
portion of the questionnaire are displayed
m Table 2.5 Among the most frequently
cited benefits are those that address the
clarification of organizational expectations
and standards. For example, 66 percent of
the respondents agreed that merit pay has
led to the clarification of individual roles
and responsibihties. Almost 56 percent
mdicated that the relationship between
monetary rewards and performance was
clarified by the implementation of merit
pay. In addition, more than 54 percent
agreed that merit pay facilitated the clarify-
cation of performance standards and mea-
sures.
By contrast, relatively modest numbers
of respondents agreed with statements sug-
gestmg that merit pay succeeded m achiev-
mg more mstrumental objectives in their
* sig at 10 R’ = 34
&dquo;sigat05
&dquo;’ stg at 01
N = 37
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urg,tiiiz,dtiun~,. Only 39 percent, for ex-
ample, agreed that it actually mcreased
employee motivation or productivity.b
Approximately 37 percent found that it
increased employee satisfaction. While
these benefits are often cited in support of
pay for performance in general, the rela-
tively small proportions of respondents see-
ing these outcomes associated with ment
pay suggest that this approach to pay-for-
performance may not always be a reliable
mechanism for enhancing employee moti-
vation and satisfaction.
It is sometimes argued that merit pay will
help organizations attract and retain top
caliber employees (Ingraham, 1993a;
Milkovich & Wigdor, 1991). Results from
the current survey, however, do not sug-
gest that state governments frequently re-
alize these benefits. In fact, only 22 per-
cent of the respondents with merit pay 111
their organizations indicate that it has im-
proved recruiting, and only 27 percent agree
that it has led to decreased employee turn-
over in their organizations.’ 7 Other pro-
posed benefits fare no better. Only approxi-
mately 15 percent of respondents believe
that political executives have more control
over career bureaucrats under a merit-pay
plan or that merit pay has reduced labor
costs.
The fact that the clarification of perfor-
mance standards, individual roles and re-
sponsibilities, and the relationship between
monetary rewards and performance are the
most commonly observed benefits of ment
pay is mtriguing. While these objectives
may be viewed by some as secondary,
Ingraham (1993b) found that improved
manager-employee communication was the
most frequently mentioned expectation for
pay for performance among directors of
state personnel agencies. Findings here are
similar 111 that the &dquo;clarification&dquo; cited by
survey respondents is most likely achieved
through better commumcations between
individuals and their supervisors.
What Negative Outcomes Are Associated
with Merit Pay?
As mdicated earlier, research on the
impact of pay for performance has fre-
quently reported a number of negative ef
fects associated with its application. This
is especially true of evaluations of merit-pay
plans (Daley, 1987; Pearce & Perry, 1983;
Pearce, Stevenson, & Perry, 1985). Draw-
ing on previous studies, respondents were
asked to assess the extent to which merit
pay produced specific negative impacts (see
Table 3). Respondents voiced the greatest
concern about the propensity of such sys-
tems to generate orgamzational red tape.
More specifically, over 67 percent agreed
that ment pay has increased demands on
supervisors’ time, and more than 64 per-
cent agree that it has led to the need for
extensive documentation and paperwork.
Of the other problems listed m Table 3,
several are of such a fundamental nature
that the perceived negative outcomes may
hint at critical problems associated with
the concept. For example, nearly 63 per-
cent of the personnel executives m organi-
zations with merit-pay systems agreed with
the statement that merit pay has reduced
employee confidence m supervisory objec-
tivity and precision, and 56.9 percent per-
ceive that their system fails to consistently
discriminate among different levels of em-
ployee performance. In addition, over 47
percent of the respondents perceived that
performance awards are not distributed
fairly. As noted by Milkovich and Wigdor
(1991), an individual’s perception of pro-
cedural fairness may be linked subsequently
to his or her level of job satisfaction. That
bemg the case, a poorly structured merit-
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pay system may actually undermine em-
ployee job satisfaction and motivation to
perform.
Differentiating Among Perceptions of
Effectiveness and Ineffectiveness of Pay for
Performance
Respondents reporting the utilization of
memt pay in their organizations were di-
vided into two groups: one that perceived
pay for performance as at least shghtly ef
fective and another that at least slightly
disagreed with the statement that pay for
performance was effective. Average (mean)
responses of these two groups on the issues
specific to merit pay displayed m Tables 2
and 3 were then calculated and compared
in order to determine whether perceptions
of advantages and disadvantages of merit
pay help to differentiate between the groups
and which particular issues appear to be
most salient.8 For several of the items there
were pronounced differences between the
groups as expected. The clearest example
of such a pattern occurred with respect to
the statement that merit pay increased mo-
tivation among employees. As Table 4
shows, respondents differed significantly on
this issue, with those who considered pay
for performance ineffective disagreeing with
the statement and those who found pay for
performance to be effective more likely to
agree that merit pay worked to motivate
employees. Interesting differences in re-
sponse patterns are also found on the ques-
tion of whether the use of merit pay has led
to a lack of confidence among employees
m supervisory objectivity and precision m
rating employee performance. Both groups
were inclined to agree that employee con-
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fidence in supervisory objectivity and pre-
cision declmed with merit pay, but those
who had previously rated pay for perfor-
mance as ineffective agreed with this ob-
servation most strongly.
Overall, significant differences existed
on all but seven of the items listed in Table
4. Thus, most items are important in de-
termming perceptions of pay for perfor-
mance. Among the items for which there
are no significant differences, however, one
of the more interesting is the issue of
whether merit pay clarified the relationship
between monetary rewards and perfor-
mance. Average responses indicate that
those who saw pay for performance as ef-
fective were likely to agree (at least slightly)
with this proposition and those finding pay
for performance ineffective were generally
undecided, but the difference between the
two groups was not statistically significant.
Other items for which there was relatively
little dbagleemenr mcluded the issues of
whether merit pay improved management
and supervisory control over subordinates
and whether it reduced labor costs, led to
greater accountability to the public, led to
increased demands on supervisors time, in-
creased paperwork, and resulted ultimately
in employees feeling that they were inad-
equately compensated. Average responses
on all of these questions are reported in
Table 4.
Factors Making the Implementation of
Merit Pay Difficult
It is sometimes the case that problems
associated with merit pay can be traced to
the lack of proper implementation of the
concept (Daley, 1987; Pearce & Perry,
1983; Pearce, Stevenson, & Perry, 1985).
In an effort to discern the extent to which
state personnel executives experienced spe-
cific implementation problems identified in
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other studies, those surveyed were asked to
respond to potential difficulties listed in
Table 5. The most commonly experienced
problems appear to be those related to ad-
equate funding of the systems. For example,
over 70 percent of state personnel execu-
tives agreed that both a lack of sufficient
funding and fixed pay-for-performance bud-
gets made implementation difficult. In ad-
dition to problems with funding, a major-
Survey responses were scored from 1 (strongly agree) to 7 (strongly disagree)
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ity of the respondents also expressed cuil-
cern over the ability to develop good per-
formance measures and the ability to apply
performance measures consistently. These
findmgs match those of previous research
on federal and local jurisdiction and sug-
gest, therefore, that similar implementation
problems exist at all levels of government
using merit-pay systems (Gabns, 1986;
Milkovich & Wigdor, 1991; Perry, 1986;
Perry, Petrakis, & Miller, 1989;U.S. Gen-
eral Accountmg Office, 1990).
Why Does the Concept Survive?
Why are state governments contmuing
to use the ment pay approach to pay for
performance given that considerable re-
search suggests that it often fails to achieve
its objectives and is plagued continually by
similar problems across different systems
and governmental units? To better under-
stand this issue, respondents were asked to
iatc the extent to which a number of dif-
ferent factors contributed to the continued
use of merit pay in their organizations (see
Table 6). One reason agreed upon was that
merit pay makes employees responsible for
performing high quality work. Over 76 per-
cent agreed with this proposition, although
as noted earlier a much smaller proportion
of respondents actually believe pay for per-
formance is effective in their organizations
and fewer still see merit pay as an effective
strategy for motivating employees. It is also
the case that nearly 73 percent of the re-
spondents indicated that their organizations
continue to use merit pay because a sub-
stantial investment had been made in the
system. Sixty-three percent of the respon-
dents also thought that their organization
continued to utilize merit-pay systems be-
cause merit pay has been successfully used
in the private sector. Less than a majority
(42.4 percent) of the respondents agreed
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that merit pay was contmued because it
enhances political executives’ control over
career bureaucrats.
Despite evidence of negative outcomes
and implementation difficulties commonly
encountered with merit pay, 81 percent of
the pay-for-performance users with merit-
pay systems believe that their orgamzation
should not abandon the concept. In an ef
fort to gauge the perceived level of useful,
ness of pay for performance in general
among nonusers, individuals whose orga-
mzations had not implemented a pay-for-
performance system were asked whether or
not they believed it is a potentially useful
tool. Approximately 77 percent of those
respondents mdicated that pay for perfor-
mance is at least a somewhat potentially
useful pay strategy (see Figure 2).
Conclusion
This research has produced a number of
mterestmg results. First, it does not appear
that state governments are backmg away
from the use of pay for performance. In
fact, there is some indication that the utili-
zation of pay for performance is more wide-
spread now than in the 1980s. Second, pay
for performance m the states almost always
means the implementation of merit pay.
Nearly all pay-for-performance systems m
place make use of that strategy, although a
number of difficulties are often associated
with that approach to pay for performance.
Even so, a majority of state personnel man-
agers m orgamzations with pay for perfor-
mance report that their system is at least
somewhat effective in motivating employ-
ees and mcreasmg productivity. When
lookmg at perceptions of effectiveness more
closely, it appears that managers with less
experience in personnel administration or
those whose personnel experience is hm-
ited to the public sector, those who are po-
htical appointees, and those who have sys-
tems covering only managerial employees
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are decidedly more positive m their assess-
ment of pay for performance.
A question that remains is why, given
the common problems experienced, does
pay for performance-especially programs
that mclude merit pay-contmue to flour-
ish ? Part of the explanation may be that
alternative &dquo;grade and step&dquo; approaches
where pay increases are distributed almost
automatically as rewards for employees’
contmued service are difficult to reconcile
with widely held notions of meritocracy. A
large share of state personnel managers, for
example, agree with the statement that
merit pay is mamtamed in their organiza-
tions because it makes employees respon-
sible for performing high quality work.
Other explanations are also plausible, how-
ever. Almost 73 percent of the personnel
managers surveyed suggest that merit pay
contmues because of substantial past mvest-
ments m the system. As with numerous
other programs, once merit pay is in place,
and it has presumably been sold to employ-
ees and the public as a desirable reform, it
may be difficult for an organization to aban-
don it. Other reasons for the endurance of
merit pay mclude the belief that it has been
Figure 2. Perceptions of the Potential Usefulness of Pay for Performance
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successful m the private sector and the idea
that it enhances supervisors’ control over
subordinates. A majority of state agency
personnel managers also acknowledged that
it serves as a symbolic response to public
perceptions of bureaucratic inefficiency and
demands for accountability.
What does the future hold for pay for
performance in state government? It is dif
ficult to know with certamty, but the con-
cept does appear to have a tenacious hold
on state policy makers. While efforts to
implement pay for performance may be well
mtended and can certainly be understood,
decision makers should give careful consid-
eration to the experiences highlighted here,
especially the apparent inability of govern-
ments to achieve many of the objectives of
pay for performance, the persistent prob-
lems encountered during implementation,
and the possibility of negative side effects
associated with pay-for-performance sys-
tems.
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1According to regulations issued by the U. S.
Office of Personnel Management, "An agency may
grant a cash, honorary, or informal recognition
award, or grant time-off without charge to leave
or loss of pay" for supenor performance by an
individual or group (U.S. Federal Register, 1995,
p. 43964). Cash awards, however, are to be
"lump-sum payments" only. Quality step
increases that have always been part of the
General Schedule pay system are permitted, but
the required linkage between general increases
in base pay and performance that existed under
the Performance Management and Recognition
System no longer exists.
2It is possible that pay for performance is
even more widely utilized. If there are states
with organizations using pay for performance
but managers from those organizations were not
in our sample, then utilization could exceed the
level reported here.
3Only cases with valid observations on all
variables in the model were included in the
analysis.
4When considering this finding and the
operationalization of this variable, one must
bear in mind that more than 90% of the
respondents have merit pay as part of their pay-
for-performance system. An examination of the
six respondents in organizations using bonus
systems and/or group-based approaches
exclusively, reveals that two evaluated their
system as effective, three did not consider their
system to be effective, and one was uncertain.
5Many of the same positive and negative
outcomes examined here were previously
examined with respect to pay for performance
in local government in an insightful article by
Streib and Nigro, 1993.
6These findings are particularly interesting
since a considerably larger proportion of
respondents (56.5 percent) had reported earlier
that they considered their overall pay-for-
performance system an effective tool for
motivating employees and increasing
productivity.
7A general reduction in turnover is, of
course, not necessarily the result of a greater
ability to retain top caliber employees, but the
argument is that good employees will be more
likely to be retained under pay for performance
than poorer employees. At the same time, it
could be argued that if merit pay led to increased
turnover of lower quality employees, such an
outcome would be beneficial.
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8Survey response categories for these items
included strongly agree, agree, slightly agree,
neither agree nor disagree, slightly disagree,
disagree, and strongly disagree. Responses were
scored from 1 (strongly agree) to 7 (strongly
disagree). In Tables 2 and 3, this seven-point
scale was collapsed into three categories.
However, in calculating mean responses to each
item the original seven-point scale was used.
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